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Abstract 
The REIT concept originates from the United States and invests in an income-producing real estate. Tax Return Act 
of 1986 allowed conversion of externally managed REITs to internal management structure to reduce conflict of 
interest and increase efficiency. Significant findings give merit to internally managed REITs showing they 
outperform externally managed REITs and have stronger corporate governance. However, REITs regimes in Asia 
Pacific region (Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, Malaysia) are exclusive externally managed structure either by default 
or requirement highlighting some merits exist to the approach. With the rising number of REITs regimes, academic 
understanding of the effects of management structure and performance of REITs is required. This paper 
contributes to existing literature by exploring the impact of management structures on the performance of REITs 
regimes. This study adopts a systematic review of selected academic journal papers using Scopus. Empirical 
findings point to the benefits of internal managed REITs over externally managed REITs. Corporate governance 
proxies unique to external managed REIT such as; REIT organisations, remuneration, fees and related party 
transactions need improvement to boost performance. We find evidence that external managed REITs try to 
emulate internally managed REITs, increasing institutional investor carrying out more monitoring, employing less 
leverage and link compensation to performance to increase REITs value. As externally managed REITs become 
popular, similar results as internally managed REITs are obtainable and may be more applicable to REITs with 
smaller market capitalisation. To achieve this, high quality of corporate governance, skilled management team and 
transparency in fee structure become crucial. 
Keywords: REITs; agency conflicts; management structure; externally management; internal management; 
performance 
1. Introduction   
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) structure was established in 1960 in the United States and arose to allow 
large to small investors an opportunity to invest in the otherwise capital-intensive real estate sector (Semer 2009). 
Since then, the concept of REITs has grown worldwide, now in over 30 countries and made up of over 296 
individual corporations with a market value as at March 2018 of $1.14 trillion (FTSE 2018). REITs generate income 
by owning, developing, and operating income-producing real estate. Income can be derived from rents on a pool 
of properties or mortgages payments. Shares of REITs are traded not unlike shares on the stock exchange. Owners 
of REITs shares earn income from dividends from the net income earnings that it generates. REITs offer the 
benefits of long-term performance, stable dividend yields, higher liquidity, transparency, and portfolio 
  
REAL ESTATE AND LAND PLANNING 2018  
Available online at https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/reland 
 
 
 
144 
 
diversification (CAHF 2017). Regulations of REITs are relatively similar globally with slight country variations and 
present an avenue for researchers in areas such as corporate governance and firm performance. Hartzell et al. 
(2006) and Yönder (2013) identified the following unique regulatory setting that allows for empirical research: 
 REITs offer a better measure of market value using Tobin’s q as all significant assets are reflected in their 
financial statement.  
 Internal cash flow is restricted as REITs are required to pay almost 90% of earnings as a dividend to be 
exempt from corporate taxes, requiring REIT managers to be more efficient.   
 To maintain REITs status, most REITs must have 75% of their assets in real estate or related businesses 
and generate almost 75% of gross income from real estate rent, interest, or mortgages on real properties.  
 Ownership requirement for most REIT regimes requires that they be widely owned. Institutional owners 
do not break this rule as their ownership is passed through beneficiaries. The inclusion of institutional 
ownership by current legislation allows for better monitoring of REIT managers (Wang et al. 1993).  
Following the seminal work of Jensen & Meckling (1976) we draw that just like any other large corporation, REITs 
are not immune to the agency conflicts that are likely to occur when there is a separation of ownership from 
management. In an attempt to reduce conflict of interest between management and shareholders, corporate 
governance mechanisms are created to ensure long-term sustainable performance. Numerous researchers have 
investigated how the REITs management structures can affect the performance of REITs due to the agency 
conflicts. The principal and agent problems could lead to situations such as; entrenchment and empire building by 
REIT managers leading to overinvestment or underinvestment, as well as other corporate governance issues 
(Chong et al. 2017b). REITs management structure takes on two predominate types which are internally managed 
and externally managed. Under the internally managed structure, managers are employed and controlled by the 
REIT entity. REITs employ their advisors, acquisition, and asset management staff. Conversely, externally managed 
REITs control and ownership separation occurs more clearly. The REIT entity employs an intermediary asset 
management firm to undertake the day-to-day property management, financial and operational tasks. In return, 
the REIT entity pays managers various fees for management. These fees come in two types, a base fee which is a 
percentage of the values of the fund's asset under management (AUM) and an incentive fee based on a 
percentage of the portfolio's income. The inferior performance of externally managed REITs in the US and issues 
caused by the global financial crisis has brought about the need to question fees paid to externally managed REITs 
executives (Ooi 2009). Figure 1 below shows the typical structure of externally managed REITs commonly observed 
in Asia REITs with a Sponsor and Trust Manager. For internally managed REITs, the Trust undertakes the role of 
Trust Manager with or without a Sponsor.  
 
Fig. 1 Generic externally Managed REITs structure  Source: (Lecomte & Ooi 2013) 
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From a historical context drawn from the US, REITs initially acted not unlike mutual funds but with the potential for 
trading. It was expected that REITs employed advisors that acted as managers with the duties of selection of 
properties and execution of property investment strategies on behalf of the REIT. Unlike other passive investments 
such as bonds and shares, property investments require active management hence the need to employ property 
managers; thus in the late 1980s, several REITs observed this inefficiency and conflict of interest between 
advisors/property managers and REIT shareholders (Wei et al. 1995; Ambrose & Linneman 2001). In 1986, change 
in laws allowed REITs undertake self-advisory and management. Fueling the rapid growth of REITs in the 1990s and 
spurred a range of academic research examining the organisational management structure of REITs and its impact 
on REITs performance. In Table 1 below, a sample of REIT regimes is reviewed. The justification of REITs internally 
managed over externally managed as seen from its earliest implementation in the US has not prevented REIT 
regimes elsewhere from embracing externally managed structure. Predominately, REITs especially in Asia, adopt 
an externally managed structure either by default or requirement which shows that some merits exist in externally 
managed REITs. With the increase in the adoption of REITs as a means of indirect investment in the property 
market, it is essential to understand how management styles and corporate governance strength of REITs have 
affected performance. 
Table 1: Sample of Internally managed vs. Externally managed REIT 
REIT/Year of Origin Internal Management  External Management  
US (1960) 169 26 
UK (2007) 24 13 
Netherlands (1969) 4 0 
France (2003) 17 2 
Belgium (1995) 8 2 
South Africa (2013) 19 5 
Italy (2007) 3 1 
Australia (1985) 19 14 
Ireland (2013) 1 2 
Spain (2009) 1 3 
Mexico (2004) 0 8 
Hong Kong (2003) 0 8 
Singapore (1999) 0 37 
Japan (2000) 0 45 
Greece 4 0 
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2. Research Methodology  
This paper contributes to the body of knowledge on REITs management structure, corporate governance, and 
performance in both developed and emerging regimes. A systematic critical review of the relevant existing 
literature is carried out using Scopus search engine to retrieve academic peer-reviewed journals focusing on the 
key thematic areas. Scopus is selected over other search engines such as Google Scholar and Web Science because 
of the higher ability to apply appropriate filters and retrieve citation count which increases the relevance of peer-
reviewed journal obtained (Tober 2011). 
On Scopus, an advanced query search is carried out, under "Article Title, Abstract, Keyword" section, to search for 
relevant papers the following keywords were used to create the query string: "REITs", "real estate investment 
trust", "internal management", "external management", "corporate governance", "agency". It should be noted 
that the keywords used here were not intended to be exhaustive but applied to obtain an initial number of useable 
papers. Following Tsai & Wen (2005), papers of the types of ‘editorial', ‘commentary', ‘responses', and ‘book 
reviews' have been excluded from the analysis. The date range is left unlimited as the concept of REITs started in 
1960 and change in the management structure did not occur until 1986. Additionally, limiters are placed on 
“Language” for only English journals and “Subject Area”. The search using these queries identified 86 papers 
including papers published in key real estate journals (e.g. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics). Further 
analysis of abstracts was carried out; it was observed that some studies referred exclusively to “earning 
management”, “REITs”, “leverage”, “capital structure” etc. but not relevant to themes of this study identified 
above. Consequently, these are excluded. After filtering, 19 papers were found valid for further analysis. Though 
this sample may be relatively small, it is enough to draw conclusions considerably and gain an in-depth 
understanding of the academic stand on REITs management structure and performance.  
3. Classification and Analysis of the Literature    
In this section, a systematic classification of the 19 selected journal publications based on publication year, journal 
title, country/territory, citation count, REIT regime sampled is carried out, to present a contextual understanding 
of the literature on REITs management structure and performance.  In Figure 2 below, a distribution of the 
relevant articles published from 2000 is shown. It is observed that the published papers only go above one paper 
by 2012 with no publications at various points but is at its highest in 2017 with five papers. It is inferred that given 
the age and growth of REITs and assumed that academic research on REITs management structure should be more 
plentiful. The literature was further analyzed with respect to the journal of publication to identify the important 
journals in this area.  
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Fig. 2 Analysis of Publication Year 
Figure 3 below shows that the twenty papers were spread across ten journals. The Journal of Real Estate Finance 
and Economics had the most publications of seven papers representing 37 percent of the papers obtained, 
followed next by The Journal of Real Estate Literature with three papers with 15 percent of the publications. 
Majority of journals here represent the popular journals for publication in academic real estate research.  
 
Fig 3 Paper distribution by the journal of publication 
Appendix A gives the frequency count for citation, the country origin of the paper author, sampled period, REIT 
regime sampled and empirical findings. It is observed that majority of the papers (11) originated from the US, 
followed by Singapore (5) and Malaysia (4). This should not be confused with the country of sample data 
collection; for this REIT regime sampled for analysis draw mostly from the US and the Asia Pacific region 
(Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Japan, and New Zealand). This classification makes it possible to imply that the 
REITs management structure in other regimes especially emerging regimes has yet to receive enough research on 
its implication on performance. The exclusion is given to study by Das & Thomas (2016) study of REITs in India. 
From the sampled papers, the top 5 with the most citations originate and research the REIT regimes in the US and 
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Singapore with the work of Capozza & Seguin (2000) cited 67 times since publication. The empirical findings from 
these research papers document below. 
4. Discussion of Empirical Findings  
Content analysis is further carried out to provide summary information about the empirical findings of the sampled 
research studies. Content analysis is a technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the 
manifest content of communication (Bos & Tarnai 1999). From the research papers analyzed, empirical evidence 
can be broadly broken down into evidence from the United States (has both internally and externally managed) 
and Asia Pacific (mostly externally) REIT regimes. In the US, the growth of internally managed REITs was linked to 
the introduction of Tax Return Act in 1986 allowing for the conversion of most externally managed REITs to 
internally managed REITs. However, the externally managed structure of REITs persists, as it is the most used 
structure of management in the Asia REITs of Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia etc. which are all exclusively 
externally managed.  The 19 selected journal publications are analyzed to document what the effects a chosen 
management structure of a REIT will have on its performance.  
Empirical results from research on US REITs show mixed results. Pre-1986, externally managed REITs mostly 
underperformed internally managed REITs (Capozza & Seguin 2000; Brockman et al. 2014). For externally managed 
non-traded REITs, large up-front fees paid to related parties for transactions and conflict of interests resulted in 
lower return (Henderson et al. 2016). Delcoure (2005) find that internally managed REITs enjoyed favourable 
compensation as well. A study by Miller et al. (2006) show contrary to earlier observations, the performance of 
external managed or internal managed REITs depend on the measure of output. Measuring using assets showed 
that externally managed REITs outperformed internally managed REITs as externally managed REITs receive 
compensation based on assets. Based on revenue, internally managed REITs exhibited more efficiency which is 
ideal for shareholders. On the other hand, Deng et al. (2017) document that externally managed REITs get better 
loan contract terms as they are now less information opaque due to the need to keep up with internally managed 
post-1986. Additionally, post-1986 externally managed REITs limit the agency conflicts by choosing lower leverage 
levels (Lewis et al. 2003; Striewe et al. 2013).  
Empirical results from research on Asian show that REITs with externally managed structure have improved 
performance and reduced conflict of interest. We ascribe this to the improvement of externally managed REITs 
post 1992 as they recognise the need to compete and remain relevant alongside side internally managed REITs and 
institutional investors who carry out more monitoring (Cashman et al. 2014; Park 2017). Compensation structure 
and application of leverage of externally managed REITs remains a very topical issue. Ideally, benchmarking 
incentive fees against a predetermined performance level is recommended as instead of higher base fees (Ooi 
2009). Additionally, the strength of corporate governance of Asia's externally managed REITs has gradually 
improved resulting in improved stock performance and market value in most cases. Though when measured 
alongside their corporate governance strengths, issues exclusive to externally managed REITs such as; REIT 
organisation, related party transactions, fees and remuneration matters exhibit limited disclosure on these proxies 
which negatively impacts the quality of corporate governance and performance measures. This has resulted in 
suggestions for conversion to internal management structure by some researchers (Lecomte & Ooi 2013; Chong et 
al. 2016; Chong et al. 2017a; Chong et al. 2017b).  However, Downs et al. (2016) on related party transactions 
reports that it tends to be higher in Asia than to those in the US which had a positive effect for higher values for 
Asian REITs, as more credible transaction increased related party transactions. Tang & Mori (2017) also reports 
that committed and expert sponsors help enhance the quality of external management and value. 
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In the context of emerging REIT regimes found in markets such as the Asia Pacific and Africa, the attractiveness of 
externally managed REITs is because of economic and political instability; civil law based legal systems; lack of 
development and management expertise; high level of corruption and poor disclosure. The external management 
structure when implemented should be seen as a strategic decision, based on the willingness of property owners 
to cede control, a trade-off between the possibility of agency cost and benefits of capturing local soft information 
which should be attractive for an organization wanting to operate in emerging REIT regimes  (Cashman et al. 2014; 
Das & Thomas 2016). 
5. Conclusion  
This paper documents the effects internal and external management structures adopted by real estate investment 
trusts in developed and emerging regimes have on its performance by carrying out a systematic review of 
published academic papers obtain from Scopus. It is well documented that the separation of ownership from 
control creates a conflict of interests which becomes more escalated by an external management structure. The 
tax reforms in 1986 saw US REITs transition from a mostly external management structure to a predominate 
internal management structure to further align shareholders objectives with management reducing agency conflict 
and increase efficiency. The internal management structure is popular amongst most western REITs (UK, France, 
Spain, Greece etc.). On the other hand, we document that most emerging REIT regimes of Asia Pacific are almost 
all predominately externally managed which in some way clearly show some merits remain for externally managed 
REITs. From a systematic review, 19 academic research papers are obtained from Scopus with publications ranging 
from 2000 to 2017 using thematic keywords related to this research during mostly from the US and Asia Pacific 
REITs. We document that from the research papers evaluated; the US REITs post-1992 saw an improved 
performance of externally managed REITs to resemble those of their internally managed counterparts as to remain 
competitive. The externally managed Asian REITs, however, saw mixed results when measuring operating 
performance and market value. The popular inefficiencies linked to remuneration, compensation structures, 
related party transactions and gearing of externally managed REIT has been greatly reduced. Disclosure in these 
areas remains a strong issue for most externally managed REITs. Current studies still prescribe that externally 
managed REITs convert to internal management. However, contrary evidence also shows that for emerging REITs 
regimes an external management structure may be preferable as it provides the opportunity to engage local 
expertise while still tackling issues synonymous with emerging markets. 
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Appendix  
Appendix A Breakdown of Paper sampled by Citation count, Country/ Territory and REIT regime Sampled and Empirical Findings 
Authors 
Citati
ons 
Country/Te
rritory 
REIT Regime 
Sampled 
Empirical Finding 
Capozza & Seguin 
(2000) 
67 US US (1982-1992) 
Externally Managed REITs underperformed by 7%.  
Employed more financial leverage, taking more debt to 
increase property investment, hence compensation. No 
clear evidence of asset or business risks for both 
management styles 
Ooi (2009) 12 Singapore 
Singapore 
(2003-2008) 
REITs compensation structure affect price during pre and 
post IPOs. Pre IPO, low base fees alongside pre-
established performance linked incentive fee. Post-IPO, 
the manager on benchmarked incentive fees performed 
better than those with higher base fees. 
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Lewis et al. (2003) 12 US US (1995-1997) 
Measuring magnitude of internal and external managerial 
efficiency, industrial efficiency, they find that internally 
managed REITs had better operating performance in 1995 
and 1996 and used less debt performed more efficiently.   
Lecomte & Ooi 
(2013) 
11 Singapore 
Singapore 
(2003-2008) 
Using a scoring framework for measuring the quality of 
corporate governance of externally managed REITs finds 
that though corporate governance scores have gradually 
improved, areas such as fee and remuneration showed 
deviation and ranked lowly due to limited disclosure. A 
positive relationship between corporate governance and 
stock performance but not on operating performance 
(ROA and ROE). But no link with related party transaction 
and outperformance 
Striewe et al. (2013) 6 
US/Germa
ny 
US (1994-2000) 
Externally managed REITs choose lower leverage levels 
than internally managed REITs. After the 1986 reform, the 
remaining externally managed REITs limited agency issues 
by not taking excessive leverage.  
Miller et al. (2006) 5 US US (1995-2003) 
Estimated returns did not support the economy of scale 
for all but smaller REITs. Contrary to conventional wisdom 
that internally managed structure is better than external 
management, they show different outcomes depending 
on the measure of output. When measuring output using 
assets, internally managed associates with inefficiency as 
externally managers receive compensation tied to assets. 
When measured using output with revenue internally 
managed REIT exhibit more efficiency. Revenue growth 
better captures goal of maximizing shareholder value.  
Brockman et al. 
(2014) 
3 US US (1985-2007) 
The inclusion of institutional shareholders dramatically 
changed REIT performance. Prior to 1992 externally 
managed structure underperformed internally managed 
REITs. Post-1992 saw no clear difference between both 
management styles attributed to an increase in 
institutional investors.  
Cashman et al. (2014) 2 US 
Australia, India, 
Hong Kong, 
New Zealand, 
Singapore, 
Japan (-2011) 
Find evidence to show that taking on the external 
management structure allows REITs to access and act on 
local information leading to better performance. External 
management structure is more suitable for countries with 
a better contracting environment which helps to diminish 
agency cost. Internally managed REITs invested in more 
countries had more insider ownership. However, 
externally managed REITs had more institutional 
investors. 
Das & Thomas (2016) 1 
US/Switzer
land 
India 
Evaluated the managerial challenges and opportunities 
for the introduction of REITs in India, identifies the 
potential for some commercial real estate property 
companies to convert to a REIT structure as it is like global 
REIT regulations. REITs externally managed show 
  
REAL ESTATE AND LAND PLANNING 2018  
Available online at https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/reland 
 
 
 
153 
 
similarity with most developing and Asian REIT regimes. 
They identified that property owners might be reluctant 
to cede control to external management which may 
prevent the smooth conversion to the REIT structure.  
Chong et al. (2016)  1 Malaysia 
Singapore 
(2008-2012) 
Evaluated the impact of corporate governance on the 
performance of externally managed S-REIT. Corporate 
governance not only helped improve performance and 
ROA but also helped gauge excess return. But no impact 
on ROE. Individual CG proxies; REIT organization and 
ownership had a negative impact on S-REIT. They called 
for a reevaluation of the management structure of S-
REITs as agency cost still exists in the external 
management style. 
Delcoure (2005) 1 US US (1999-2001) 
Analyzed top managerial compensation using equity REITs 
and REOCs. Amongst other findings, executive’s long-term 
compensation related to the volatility of funds from 
operation and that internally-managed REITs managers 
enjoyed favourable compensation  
Tang & Mori (2017) 
 
Singapore 
Japan, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, 
and Singapore 
(2002-2012) 
On the externally managed Asian REITs market examined 
the role of sponsor ownership in relation to agency issues 
on firm values. Amongst other things finds that higher 
firm values of REITs with committed sponsors stems from 
superior cash flows and that real estate expertise from 
developer sponsor enhances the quality of REITs 
management team. They also document that managers 
didn’t carry out dividend smoothing to meet expected 
dividend distributions.  
Deng et al. (2017) 
 
Singapore/
Australia 
US (1987-2009) 
Tested for information asymmetry across internal and 
external REITs on loan contract terms. The result shows 
that externally managed REITs are offered more 
favourable loan contract term (lower loan rates, lower 
collateral requirements and fewer loan covenants). This is 
linked to banks viewing external REITs as less information 
opaque and have less pre-contract uncertainty than 
internally managed REITs.   
Park (2017) 
 
South 
Korea 
Singapore, 
Hong Kong, and 
Japan (2005-
2013) 
Examined the potential of conflict of interest between 
externally managed REITs in Asia and outside advisors 
/sponsors and its impact on value. They find that 
sponsored externally managed REITs emulated internally 
advised REIT in response to market pressure and are 
forced to operate at higher transparency to remain 
attractive to global institutional investors. No acute 
agency problem controlling sponsors is observed.  
Chong et al. (2017a)  
 
Malaysia 
Japan, 
Singapore, 
Hong Kong, and 
Examined the impact of free cash flow (FCF) on agency 
costs and FCF and agency cost on the performance of 
REITs in Asia. They find risks of FCF is minimal in REITs due 
to the REIT effect. Though they find the existence of FCF 
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Malaysia (2002-
2012) 
and agency cost in externally managed Asian REITs 
causing a discount in value. They suggest that conversion 
to internal management may reduce the cost of 
adjustment resulting from the agency.  
Chong et al. (2017b) 
 
Malaysia 
Japan, 
Singapore, 
Hong Kong, and 
Malaysia (2008-
2012) 
Studied the impact of corporate governance (CG) of the 
externally managed Asian REITs on performance. They 
find that CG helps to improve ROA but gauge excess of 
REIT managers. They find that the CG proxies of REITs 
organization, remuneration matters, and fees of 
externally managed Asian REITs decrease performance 
due to lack of transparency and disclosure policies. Again, 
a conversion to internal management is made. 
Henderson et al. 
(2016) 
 
US US (2000-2015) 
Evaluated externally managed non-traded REIT 
investment returns over holding periods starting with 
initial offerings and ending on the first listing or 
acquisition date or date of provision of updated NAV. 
They documented lower returns earned by investors in 
non-traded REITs which is linked to large up-front fees 
paid to related parties for management/advisement and 
conflict of interests which permeate the non-trade REIT 
structure. This is further enhanced by the lack of proper 
monitoring by institutional investors.  
Downs et al. (2016) 
 
US/Singap
ore/Malays
ia 
Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, and 
Singapore 
(2003-2010) 
Tests the relationship between Related Party Transactions 
(RPT) on firm value of externally managed Asian REITs. 
Results presented show RPT for Asian REITs to be higher 
than those in the US. However, positive, and statistically 
significant is shown for Asian REITs with higher values had 
more RPTs. No significant result was shown for corporate 
governance and RPT due to the REIT effect.  
Chikolwa (2011) 
  
US 
Australia (2003-
2008) 
Identified that capital structure is affected by the conflict 
of interest between stapled management (internalizing 
asset management), shareholders, and creditors amongst 
other things. They identified that the stapled 
management structure had a negative relationship to 
leverage and ratio of short-term debt to the total asset. 
This implies that they may have lower gearing levels.  
 
 
